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Revitalizing Land Use Law: Introductory Notes
RONIT LEVINE-SCHNUR*
Pour célébrer le centenaire du zonage dans la ville de New York, je développe une
vision relative à la revitalisation de l’utilisation des terres et de la réglementation du
zonage. Le centenaire de la ville n’est pas la seule raison pour laquelle nous avons
besoin d’une telle vision. Étant donné le grand impact des lois sur l’utilisation des
terres sur la vie des personnes et sur leur entourage, il est crucial de ré-imaginer le
système d’utilisation des terres, et notamment le contrôle judiciaire des lois sur
l’utilisation des terres, et de lui donner un fondement éthique. Le système
d’utilisation des terres devrait être fondé sur un engagement éthique à promouvoir
l’équité et la durabilité. Ce système devrait être guidé par des principes de
démocratie et de transparence, par des normes d’accessibilité, de diversité et de
densité, et par l’exigence de maintenir un rapport équitable entre la distribution des
charges et l’allocation des avantages. Cet article explique pourquoi le droit relatif à
l’utilisation des terres est présentement dépourvu d’engagement éthique. L’article
offre aussi un aperçu général de la forme que pourrait prendre un tel engagement.
As a way of celebrating its centenary, I sketch out a vision of how to revitalize land use
and zoning law. Such a vision is called for not merely because of the marking of 100
years since zoning was first introduced in New York City. Due to the immense impact
land use laws have on human lives and their surroundings, it is crucial to re-imagine the
land use law system, and in particular judicial review of land use law, and to ground it
within an ethical foundation. A land use law system should be based on an ethical
commitment to fairness and sustainability. It should be guided by principles of
democracy and transparency; by norms of accessibility, diversity, and density; and by a
requirement to preserve a fair ratio between the distribution of burdens and the allocation
of benefits. This article provides an account of why land use law is currently missing an
ethical commitment and offers a broad outline of the form such an ethical commitment
could take.

THERE IS PROBABLY NO NEED FOR ANOTHER HISTORICAL REVIEW of how it all started for
zoning, and land use law more generally.1 Mumford,2 Hall,3 and Wolf,4 for instance, offer a few
*

Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel, ronit.levineschnur@idc.ac.il. I thank two
anonymous referees for their comments.
1
The article focuses on the Canadian and American experiences and does not take into account other jurisdictions’
historical turn toward extending planning and land use regulation and powers.
2
Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1961).
3
Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century
(Oxford and New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002) [Hall].
4
Michael Allan Wolf, The Zoning of America: Euclid V Ambler (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,
2008) [Wolf]. See also John F Hart, “Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Taking
Clause” (2000) 94 Nw UL Rev 1099.
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such investigations into the past. When marking now the passage of the first 100 years of zoning,
the reference is to the first comprehensive zoning plan. That plan was implemented in New York
City in 1916.5 The “Zoning Resolution,” as it was officially called, regulated and restricted the
location of different kinds of uses, such as industries and residential housing, the lot area to be
built on, and the size and height of buildings.6 Its model was soon to be followed by many other
local communities in the United States and in Canada.7 The Zoning Resolution came after some
thirty years of pioneering building restrictions which were imposed throughout North America,
including in Canada.8 Nonetheless, it was the first attempt to comprehensively regulate land use,
and for that, it gained its glory. Its lingering influence on other jurisdictions is evident, arguably,
from the close legal ties that exist between Canadian and American land use jurisprudence,
despite the many legal and cultural differences between the two countries.9
But there are at least two other competing milestones to mark the emergence of modern
land use law. The first is the planning initiatives of late ninetieth century architects, such as
Ebenezer Howard, with his plans for utopian “Garden Cities,” a detailed model for plannedfrom-above towns.10 Howardʼs ideas spread to Canada, with the support of the British planner
Thomas Adams,11 and were perceived as “the model for achieving the development of healthy,
attractive communities in Canada.”12 Or Frederick Law Olmsted, with his successful efforts in
the mid-nineteenth century to convince decision-makers in New York City to fund what would
later be known as the Central Park.13 Olmsted correctly predicted that such an urban park would
5

Stanislaw J Makeilski, The Politics of Zoning: The New York Experience, Metropolitan Series; No. 4 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966); Seymour I Toll, Zoned American (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969).
6
Raphaël Fischler, “The Metropolitan Dimension of Early Zoning: Revisiting the 1916 New York City Ordinance”
(1998) 64:2 Journal of the American Planning Association 170.
7
Elizabeth Bloomfield, “Town Planning Efforts in Kitchener-Waterloo, 1912–1925” (1980) 9 Urban History
Review / Revue d’histoire urbaine 3 [Bloomfield]; Eran Kaplinsky, “The Zoroastrian Temple in Toronto: A Case
Study in Land Use Regulation, Canadian-Style” in Eric Tucker, James Muir & Bruce Ziff, eds, Property on Trial:
Canadian Cases in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012) 223
[Kaplinsky]; Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, “Introduction” in Marcia Valiante & Anneke Smit, eds, Public
Interest, Private Property: Land and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2016) 11
[Valiante & Smit].
8
E.g. Raphaël Fischler, “Development Controls in Toronto in the Nineteenth Century” (2007) 36 Urban History
Review / Revue d’histoire urbaine 16.
9
See, e.g. Ed Morgan, “The Sword in the Zone: Fantasies of Land-Use Planning Law” (2012) 62:2 UTLJ 163
[Morgan]; Cherie Metcalf, “The (Ir) Relevance of Constitutional Protection for Property Rights? Compensation for
Takings in Canada and the United States” (2015) 65:3 UTLJ 143, 173 [Metcalf]: “In both Canada and the United
States, the reach of takings law is limited by generous deference to land use planning and zoning regulation,
weakening practical differences in the degree of protection of property across regimes;” Ronit Levine-Schnur &
Avigail Ferdman, “On the Just Distribution of Land Use Rights” (2015) 28:2 Can JL & Jur 317 [Levine-Schnur &
Ferdman]. There are however others who stress the differences between the two countries. In this article, I aim not
to emphasize differences but rather the shared grounds of the two legal systems, although, naturally similarity is a
matter of scale.
10
Sir Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-Morrow (Cambridge: MIT Press, [1902] 1965).
11
Oiva Saarinen, “The Influence of Thomas Adams and the British New Towns Movement in the Planning of
Canadian Resource Communities” in Alan FJ Artibise & Gilbert A Stelter, eds, The Usable Urban Past: Planning
Politics in the Modern Canadian City (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 1980) 268.
12
“Urban and Regional Planning” in Canadian Encyclopedia, online: <thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/urbanand-regional-planning/> [perma.cc/JBN9-5B2W].
13
Frederick Law Olmsted, “Public Parks and the Enlargement of Towns” in American Social Science Association
1870 (reprinted: Michael Larice & Elizabeth Macdonald, eds, The Urban Design Reader, 2d ed [New York:
Routledge, 2013] 36).
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have positive externalities on its surroundings, and that these could be used to secure high
property taxes.14 Indeed, early uses of zoning were designed to preserve the land values of
properties in existing residential neighbourhoods.15 Howard and Olmsted advanced, in different
ways, the idea that zoning and city planning can produce wealth, health, and prosperity,
especially when they are binding and centrally directed. Distributional concerns were not their
central interest, if an interest at all.
The second milestone in land use law was achieved in the year 1926, when the United
States Supreme Court delivered its decision in Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co.16 In this
landmark case, the US Supreme Court upheld, for the first time, a comprehensive zoning
ordinance in the Village of Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio. The Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of zoning ordinances, and ruled that a zoning ordinance must be “clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, and without substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare,” before it can be declared unconstitutional. The American Federal
government’s recognition of the zoning practice—with the enactment of the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) in 1926, and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act in 1928—
was another important step towards the legal institutionalization of zoning. Thus, by the early
part of the 20th Century, local governments had guaranteed their power to have full, almost
unhindered, discretion over zoning and urban planning decisions.17 Likewise, in Canada, the
constitutionality of zoning was never in doubt,18 although early judicial attention was given to
natural justice considerations such as generality and non-retroactive legislation.19
Planning and zoning laws are usually explained as a modern response to the genesis of
industrial cities and the resulting social challenges.20 In this sense, arguably, government
officials in Toronto, New York City, and elsewhere were inspired by ideas such as those
developed by Howard, when they aimed to promote the public’s interest by providing safe,
healthy, well organized, top-down, controlled spaces.21 Alternatively, the development of zoning
might be explained as reflecting the politics of interest groups.22 Property owners and land
developers realized Olmstead’s predictions in their broader sense and urged city politicians to
protect and enhance the value of their assets by separating uses, and regulating the density,
shape, and size of buildings in order to secure higher land values and to preserve the local tax
14

John L Crompton, “The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A Review of the Empirical Evidence” (2001) 33
Journal of Leisure Research 1.
15
Valiante & Smit, supra note 7 at 12.
16
Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 (1926) [Village of Euclid].
17
William A Fischel, “Zoning and Land Use Regulation” in Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds,
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2000) 403.
18
Leo Longo, “A Brief History of the Initial Zoning Power in Ontario and its Judicial Consideration” (2010) 72:4
Municipal and Planning Law Reports 62.
19
E.g. Cridland v City of Toronto (1920) 48 OLR 266; City of Toronto v Wheeler (1912) 3 OWN 1424; Toronto v
Williams (1912) 27 OLR 186 (Div Ct).
20
E.g. Marcia Valiante, “In Search of the ‘Public Interest’ in Ontario Planning Decisions” in Anneke Smit & Marcia
Valiante, eds, Public Interest, Private Property: Land and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver and Toronto:
UBC Press, 2016) 104 [Valiante]; Susan S Fainstein & James DeFilippis, “Introduction: The Structure and Debates
of Planning Theory” in Susan S Fainstein & James DeFlippis, eds, Readings in Planning Theory, 4th ed (Oxford and
New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016) 1; Hall, supra note 3.
21
Bloomfield, supra note 7; Kaplinsky, supra note 7 at 229–231.
22
Nadav Shoked, “Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist
Reading of Property” (2011) 28 Yale J Reg l91.
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base.23 These two background stories may stand in conflict, as they offer different justifications
and goals for land use law systems. They might, however, be conceived as complementary
explanations, since either way, whether intentionally or unintentionally, zoning laws are
correlated with racial and wealth-based segregation.24
As said, this is not an historical project. The empirical question of how zoning came to be
in any particular jurisdiction is not the focus of this article. I do wish, however, to point out that
the existence of two narratives about the purposes of zoning, two different views about the
driving forces behind its birth—efficiency versus social planning—and the tension between
them, is in fact ongoing and remains at the core of land use law.25 On the one hand, zoning is a
way to progress towards idealized forms of living. On the other hand, zoning is an externalitiesmanagement mechanism to advance particular interests of the more powerful segments of a
given society, in particular—a means to influence land prices and subsequent property taxes.26
I argue that the problem with zoning and land use law and particularly with judicial
review in this field as set from its genesis by the Euclid Court or the lack of substantial overview
of planning decisions by Canadian courts, is that zoning and land use law provides a framework
for decision-making but lacks any substantial ethical commitment. In the larger picture of
planning, the multiplicity of interests involved in the planning decision-making process has led
the judiciary, as well as many scholars, to shy away from a focus on the substantive content of
planning to the mere process of making planning decisions.27
In this short article I offer an account of how it came to be that such a commitment is
missing, provide preliminary thoughts as to what such a commitment could look like, and
suggest what type of questions should be a part of the judicial review of zoning decisions. In
other words, I argue that there is currently no “narrator” for land use law; it operates under a
formal setting of “an appeal to reason and logic, through a strong claim to objectivity and certain
knowledge, through a voice that claims objectivity and authority.”28 The omission of an ethical
commitment in zoning is especially striking given the deeply important distributive justice
considerations that are determined in the planning process, and that planning has been described
as having ethical issues at heart.29
23

J Vernon Henderson, “The Impact of Zoning Policies which Regulate Housing Quality” (1985) 18:3 J Urban Econ
302; William C Wheaton, “Land Capitalization, Tiebout Mobility, and the Role of Zoning Regulations” (1993) 34:2
J Urban Econ 102.
24
Rolf Pendall, “Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion” (2000) 66:2 J Am Inst Plann 125;
Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas S Massey, “The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial Segregation in US Urban Areas”
(2009) 44:6 Urban Affairs Review 779; Leah Platt Boustan, Competition in the Promised Land: Black Migrants in
Northern Cities and Labor Markets (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016) 105.
25
Levine-Schnur & Ferdman, supra note 9.
26
Bruce W Hamilton, “Property Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence” in Edwin S Mills &
Wallace E Oates, eds, Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls: The Economic Issues (Lexington, Mass: Lexington
Books, 1975) 13; Walter Van Nus, “Towards the City Efficient: The Theory and Practice of Zoning, 1919–1939” in
Alan FJ Artibise & Gilbert A Stelter, eds, Usable Urban Past Planning and Politics (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 1980) 237; William A Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values
Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies (Boston: Harvard U Press, 2005)
[Fischel].
27
Valiante, supra note 20 at 108; Adam J MacLeod, “Identifying Values in Land Use Regulation” (2012) 101 Ky LJ
55 [MacLeod].
28
Gerald B Wetlaufer, “Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse” (1990) 76 Va L Rev 1545, 1565.
29
Heather Campbell, “‘Planning Ethics’ and Rediscovering the Idea of Planning” (2012) 11:4 Planning Theory 379;
Mick Lennon & Linda Fox-Rogers, “Morality, Power and the Planning Subject” Planning Theory online 20 May
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I. WHY IT IS THAT LAND USE LAW LACKS AN ETHICAL
FOUNDATION?
The Village of Euclid’s zoning ordinance regulated and restricted the location of different
kinds of uses, including the lot area to be built on, and the size and height of buildings.30 As a
result, it had an adverse effect on the value of the property of Ambler Realty Co.: while the
property was held vacant waiting to be sold for industrial uses, the ordinance restricted its future
uses. This limitation meant that its worth would be 25% or less the value of progressive
industrial development which the owners had been anticipating. The US Supreme Court denied a
due process and equal protection claim based on the Ordinance’s provisions, and found that the
Ordinanceand, consequentially, all similar laws and regulationswas justified as an
application of the police power, asserted for the public welfare.31
The Euclid Court set a very high standard for when judicial interventions in the
provisions of zoning ordinance will be justifiedonly when such provisions are “clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.”32 Subsequently, in the Nectow case, shortly after Euclid was delivered, the
Court did leave the door open for concrete overruling of a zoning ordinance application to
particular conditions if the public goal was not promoted by the zoning classification as
applied.33 But a claim based on this exception has never (or almost never) been accepted, and
land use law was established as an area of law in which substantive judicial review is beyond
reach. This is as true in Canada as it is in the US.34
The governing review standard on land use law is therefore that as long as the purposes
of the land use regulation are “fairly debatable” the court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the zoning authorities.35 This is the predicted result of the judicial reluctance to find de-facto
expropriations, or “regulatory takings” as they are termed in the US, and as such, leaves judicial
intervention in land use regulation as only a theoretical option. As Valiante and Smit note, “the
restrictive test for de facto expropriation in Canada … sends a message about the wide berth for
2016. For some of the extensive debates in the planning literature over the planner’s profession and the ethical
values of planning, see, e.g. Susan S Fainstein, The Just City (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010)
[Fainstein]; Timothy Beatley, Green Urbanism: Learning from European Cities (Washington, DC: Island Press,
2012) [Beatley]. My focus is on the legal framework although it draws from these works.
30
Wolf, supra note 4 at 36–37.
31
Village of Euclid, supra note 16.
32
Ibid at para 8.
33
Nectow v Cambridge, 277 US 183 (1928) [Nectow]. It should be noted that in this case the Court found a zoning
ordinance invalid on substantive due process grounds where a master appointed by the lower state court had found
no justification for the zoning as applied to Nectow’s land. This might explain why in other cases the Court was
reluctant to intervene in zoning decisions. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E Roberts, Land Use
Planning and Development Regulation Law, 2d ed (St Paul, MN: Thomson/West 2007) 456 [Juergensmeyer &
Roberts].
34
See e.g. The Township of Scarborough v Bondi [1959] SCR 444; Cohen v Calgary (City) (1967), 64 DLR (2d)
238; Mariner Real Estate Ltd v Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1998), 65 DLR (4th) 727; Canadian Pacific
Railway v Vancouver (City), 2006 SCC 5.
35
Village of Euclid, supra note 16 at 388; Zahn v Board of Public Works, 274 US 325 (1927) 328; Nectow, supra
note 33 at 188; Robinson v City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425 (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1957) at 430.
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planning in Canada.”36 Over time, it became clear that the application of a zoning ordinance to a
particular property would not be upheld by courts, if and only if “the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.”37 Little, if any, practical limits are actually enforced on the prerogatives of local zoning
officials,38 other than in cases of bad faith, manipulative downzoning (for instance, prior to
public acquisition by a public body), or extreme discrimination.39
In the American context, the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1926 includes a
requirement that zoning be done “in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”40 Yet, the
requirement of a master plan has had little practical effect as community-wide zoning ordinances
were considered sufficient to comply.41 The recent influential ruling in Kelo42 was considered by
some as having the potential to induce a shift concerning the necessity to prepare a
comprehensive plan that contains thoughtful policy goals, at least when the government seeks to
take private property. In Kelo, the US Supreme Court (Justice Stevens) rested its finding that the
taking at issue—of Susette Kelo’s private home, for the purpose of imposing an economic
revitalization development project which would be handed over to private entities after the
taking—satisfied the constitutional requirement that taking of property be for public use, on the
existence of a plan of comprehensive character that was adopted following thorough
deliberation, a plan that “advances some conceivable public purpose.”43 Furthermore, in a
growing number of states, the adoption of zoning ordinances in the absence of a general
comprehensive plan “may cast doubts upon the validity of the ordinances.”44 This current proplanning approach is evident in other countries around the globe.45 However, there are
36

Valiante & Smit, supra note 7 at 14. See also Metcalf, supra note 9. In the American context, this is the result
of Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922), and the Penn Central framework for regulatory takings.
According to the Penn Central test, the courts examine a regulation’s “character” and “economic impact,” asking
whether the action goes beyond “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good”
and whether it “interfere[s] with distinct investment-backed expectations.” Penn Central Transportation Co. v New
York City, 438 US 124 (1978); Lingle v Chevron USA Inc., 544 US 528 (2005) at 538; Murr v Wisconsin 582 US
(2017).
37
Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980) at 260.
38
Carol M Rose, “Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy” (1983) 71:3
Cal Law Rev 901, 902 (arguing that “local readjustments of land controls may be upheld unless their redistributive
effects are egregious”); Valiante & Smit, supra note 7 at 13; Mark Fenster, “Failed Exactions” (2011) 36:3 Vt L Rev
623 at 630.
39
See e.g. Re Gibson and Toronto (1913), 28 OR 20 (CA); Hauff v Vancouver (1981), 15 MPLR 8 (BCCA).
40
SZEA § 3 (Dep’t of Commerce 1926).
41
William A Fischel, The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls
(Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1985) 33.
42
Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005) at 484. For the decisionʼs influence on Canadians, see Valiante &
Smit, supra note 7 at 25.
43
Nicole Stelle Garnett, “Planning as Public Use?” (2007) 34:2 Ecology LQ 443, 444 (“Kelo sends a signal to
Takers that planning is good.”); Wendell E Pritchett, “Beyond Kelo: Rethinking About Urban Development in the
21st Century” (2006) 22 Ga St U L Rev 895, 915–16; Daniel R Mandelker, “Kelo’s Lessons for Urban
Redevelopment: History Forgotten” Wash U L Rev Slip Opinions (24 Nov 2008), online
<http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Mandelker%20article%20-%20EIC%20edit%20final%20(clean).pdf>
[perma.cc/ND6R-SEKM].See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, “The Uselessness of Public Use” (2006) 106
Colum L Rev 1412.
44
Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 33 at 25 and 27.
45
Rachelle Alterman, “Planning Laws, Development Controls, and Social Equity: Lessons for Developing
Countries” (2014) 5 World Bank Rev 329, 329 (“Implementing or revising planning laws is a booming trend around
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substantial reasons why Americans are still hesitant to subordinate local land use decisionmaking to planning, which include deficiencies in decision-making procedures that guarantee
existing residents’ control,46 insufficient consideration of inter-local and regional impacts,47 and
the effect of the taking jurisprudence.48
In Canada, all provinces have enacted planning legislation. The task of zoning and
planning is under municipal authority as a result of provincial legislation.49 However, there have
been some changes in recent years, with the imposition of a highly prescriptive policy direction
by provincial governments, illustrated for example, in Ontario by the Provincial Policy
Statement (2014) (PPS).50 These provincial directives do not generally concern urban
development and, thus, despite the new guidance, “determining where the public interest lies in
an individual case remains challenging, and the answer is often unpredictable.”51 In addition,
despite the fact that the Act provides opportunities to allow robust public deliberation, there are
no guarantees that such deliberation is achieved in practice. As Marcia Valiante summarizes:
“the Planning Act provides no guidance to municipal councils on how to balance competing
interests.”52 Thus, Canadian municipalities, within their legislative powers, have considerable
discretion, and judicial review is not regarded as “a vehicle for consideration of the merits of a
municipality’s decision to pass the bylaw, [but rather of] whether it conforms to proper
municipal planning principles.”53 The power to quash a municipal bylaw is arguably subject to
prima facie deference,54 and practically only a failure to follow a fair process would be a ground
for quashing a bylaw.55
The provincially-mandated Ontario Municipal Board (OMB), which has oversight over
local municipalities in regard to land use planning, has often been regarded as casting shadows
over local level government’s discretion with regards to specific by-laws. The OMB holds and
applies an unusual degree of regulatory authority over planning matters in comparison to similar
tribunals in other Canadian provinces.56 The board can review all land use planning decisions of
municipalities or local boards under the Ontario Planning Act,57 and it has authority to approve
or reject those decisions or substitute them with its own decisions. The Board’s pivotal role in
the globe, especially in developing countries”).
46
See e.g. Fischel, supra note 26; David Schleicher, “City Unplanning” (2013) 122 Yale LJ 1670.
47
See Richard Briffault, “Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory” (1990) 90 Colum L Rev 346, 426–27
(discussing local externalities); Gerald Frug, City Making: Building Communities without Building Walls (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); David Schleicher, “The City as a Law and Economic Subject” (2010) U Ill L
Rev 1507, 1516–1528 (pointing to the inefficiency of having many small local governments, a reality which reduces
agglomerative gains).
48
A Dan Tarlock, “Zoned not Planned” (2014) 13:1 Planning Theory 99.
49
Jill Grant, “The Nature of Canadian Planning: Planning Canadian Communities” in Jill Grant, ed, A Reader in
Canadian Planning: Linking Theory and Practice (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008) 3, 18; Sandeep Kumar,
“Canadian Urban Design Practice: A Review of Urban Design Regulations” (2002) 11 Canadian Journal of Urban
Research 239.
50
Valiante, supra note 20 at 108–113.
51
Ibid at 108.
52
Ibid at 115.
53
Country Park Ltd v Township of Ashfield (2002), 60 OR (3d) 529 at 542 (ONCA).
54
Immeubles Port Louis Ltée v Lafontaine (Village), [1991] 1 SCR 326; Morgan, supra note 9 at 169.
55
London (City) v RSJ Holdings Inc. [2007] 2 SCR 588.
56
Sandeep Kumar, “Urban Design Decision-Making: A Study of Ontario Municipal Board Decisions in Toronto”
(2005) 14:2 Canadian Journal of Urban Research 209, 213.
57
Ontario Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P13.
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planning in Ontario is due to the fact that “it has to a great extent applied its own policy as
opposed to externally derived public policy.”58 Members of the community, including landowners and developers, may apply to the OMB concerning local level decisions to implement
changes to zoning regulations. It is necessary to prove to the OMB that the proposed alteration
furthers the intent of the comprehensive plan, where zoning changes are often among the most
contentious land use disputes.59
The OMB’s decisions are final and not subject to judicial review, except on questions of
jurisdiction or law. In Highbury, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board or the
Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing (who serves as the head of the Board), in considering
a subdivision application, was granted wide discretion, but also “that the discretion, wide though
it is, must be exercised judicially and that it is not a judicial exercise of discretion to impose
upon the applicant, as a condition of the giving of approval, an obligation the imposition of
which is not authorized by the [Planning] Act.”60 John Chipman notes that neither this decision
nor Ontario’s Planning Act provide any guidance as to how the Board was to engage in that
exercise, and it was therefore “left on its own to decide how it should do so, and it has filled this
legislative and judicial vacuum with its own policies.”61 While in a recent case, the OMB listed
the multiple public interests that it must balance in its decisions,62 the Board’s policy is that
“there is no hierarchy of rights between public and private interests … planning decisions should
attempt to balance the public good and the private interest.”63 The Board’s discretion is, in fact,
only narrowed by the province’s demand for greater adherence to “provincial interest.”
The OMB’s practices with regard to agreements under Section 37 of the Planning Act are
an interesting test case with respect to showing the influence of a quasi-judicial discretionary
body on municipalities’ behaviour.64 Under Section 37, the local government may agree to pass a
zoning by-law authorizing increases in the height and density of development otherwise
permitted by the by-law in exchange for the provision of facilities, services or other matters by
the developer. Aaron Moore has argued that while Section 37 incentivizes municipalities to
amend their own plans and by-laws as it allows them to wrest concessions and contributions
from developers, it also subordinates them to do so, because the fact that such an amendment is
needed for a proposed development project cannot justify the rejection of such an application.
The result is that local politicians’ functional control over land-use decision-making is
effectively ceded to the OMB, which can criticize those amendments.65 While the OMB has
58

John G Chipman, A Law Unto Itself: How the Ontario Municipal Board has Developed and Applied Land Use
Planning Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 19 [Chipman].
59
Jill Grant, “Tools of the Trade: Why we Regulate Land” in Jill Grant, ed, A Reader in Canadian Planning:
Linking Theory and Practice (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2008) 339, 340.
60
Etobicoke Board of Education v Highbury Developments Ltd, [1958] SCR 196 at 200; Chipman, supra note 58 at
75.
61
Ibid.
62
Re Town of Oakville OPA No 296 (2010), 64 OMBR 55 at 72–73.
63
Valiante, supra note 20 at 121.
64
See Morgan, supra note 9; Stanley M Makuch, “The Disappearance of Planning Law in Ontario,” in Marcia
Valiante & Anneke Smit, eds, Public Interest, Private Property: Land and Planning Policy in Canada (Vancouver
and Toronto: UBC Press, 2016) 99 [Makuch], who note that recent decisions of the OMB adopt the American
approach for developersʼ contributions that requires a connection between the contributions asked for and the project
receiving the bonus, such as under the Nollan/Dolan test. Nollan v Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 US 825 (1987); Dolan
v City of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994).
65
Aaron A Moore, Planning Politics in Toronto: The Ontario Municipal Board and Urban Development (Toronto:

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol27/iss1/3

35

Levine-Schnur: Revitalizing Land Use Law: Introductory Notes

developed its own policies and practices, and may have been able to offer a more coherent
approach to planning over time, it is still limited on both ends: it does not set the planning
agenda or the official city’s plan which are still left for the local government to set; and it is not
subject to substantive judicial review.
Recent reviews of the Ontario land use system, such as those offered by Stanley Makuch,
argue that the oversight powers of the OMB, along with politically-driven amendments to the
practical procedures of land use decisions, bring about lesser degrees of “rule of law” values in
the Ontario land use system. This is manifested, for example, in the loss of the right of appeal to
the OMB with respect to many planning decisions (such as under s 34(19) of the Planning Act,
which limits the right of appeal in respect of the parts of a by-law that give effect to inclusionary
zoning policies). Those changes contribute to “a growing sense that planning powers are
arbitrary and virtually limitless.”66
To conclude, the open texture of Euclid and the first Canadian land use court cases, the
lack of constitutional or clear legislative guidelines, and the complexity of land use law as it has
developed over the years, have resulted in a nearly unhindered regulatory discretion granted to
local governments (and, in the Ontario case, the OMB).67 Land use limitations are sustained “as
long as they advance the community’s general welfare,”68 and the development potential of
private land is an allocable community asset.69 The construction of the judicial review of zoning
and land use law in the Euclid case and the first Canadian court cases has been followed since
thenin the United States, in Canada,70 and in other jurisdictionsas if it was an almost
Euclidean axiom.71 What are the acceptable ends that land use laws and zoning ordinances
should promote? What is the normative basis for governmental intervention in private land
development? These and related questions were yet to be sufficiently resolved at the doctrinal
level of US or Canadian constitutional law. At the basis of this normative state of affairs, its
enabler, is the lack of an ethical foundation for land use law.
I argue that while full, substantive, judicial review of particular planning decisions should
not be introduced, we do need to pay sufficient consideration for the normative principles that
ought to guide the system of land use law. Such basic principles could assist the courts,
legislators, and the general public in evaluating how the system functions. In other words, I
contend that courts should not intervene in setting planning or development goals. But the fact
that this limited mode of intervention in the specific purposes is justified does not mean that no
normative foundation should exist. Land use law is about the allocation of resources, spaces,
University of Toronto Press, 2013).
66
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burdens, and benefits and as such, it must rest on some guiding norms to make the allocation of
development rights just and fair. Such an alternative would allow for the basic tension between
efficiency and social planning to continue, but inject to the land use system a necessary layer of
ethical commitment to fairness.

II. AN ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAND USE LAW:
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
In an urban society, land development patterns, particularly urban development, have enormous
ramifications for human prosperity, freedom, autonomy, and for economic, cultural, and social
matters.72 Conflicting visions and interests are intertwined in almost every land-based decision. It
is a common wisdom to hold that landowners’ desire is to be the sole and despotic deciders
regarding their property73 or the “agenda-setters” for it.74 Viewed from this perspective, legal
restrictions prescribing what can and cannot be done with private property are considered
interventions in a property right, which often enjoys a constitutional guarantee. 75 However, many
people, owners and non-owners,76 have an interest in there being concrete public spheres77 in
which social, political, cultural, and economic interactions can take place.78 The fact that the
world is becoming increasingly digitized does not eliminate (at least for now) the human need
72
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for physical—real as opposed to virtual—places for social interactions.79
The riots around the world circa 2011—from Tahrir Square to Wall Street, and to
Syntagma Square,80 to name just a few—exemplified people’s need to occupy public spaces to
protest and for social interactions.81 Moreover, many, even if not all, members of society would
like urban places to provide all women and men with opportunities for self-fulfillment; and they
would like the allocation of land development rights to be, at the very least, sensitive to its
effects on desired social and political policies, such as ensuring equality or protecting the
environment. Creating and maintaining vibrant public spaces, as well as promoting social goals
through the allocation of land development rights, come in conflict with property owners’
perceptions with respect to their position as such. The conflict between those interests informs
land use law.
The basic requirement from any system of land use law should be that it would be
committed to fairness and sustainability, whereas sustainability stands for fairness between
present and future, and between mankind and the environment.82 In the context of urban
planning, fairness would be guided by principles of democracy and transparency, by norms of
accessibility, diversity, and density,83 and by a requirement to preserve a fair ratio between the
distribution of burdens and the allocation of benefits. I will very briefly describe these principles
below.

A. DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY
Marking 1916 and the enactment of the first comprehensive zoning plan in New York City as the
starting point of modern land use law, as many scholars usually do, is a substantive choice. It
tells us that land use law is not only about the act of land planning per se, even if it is at the basis
of it; it is also not primarily about the legal-institutional-constitutional aspects of zoning. This
choice signals the promise which was hidden with the enactment of the first comprehensive plan
in New York City after a long process of consultation and deliberation: that zoning and city
planning can be used to secure a joint agreement about the shared expectations for the city’s
development. Land use law is thus first and foremost about the practice of determining together,
at the local level, the future of our built environments in a legally binding form.
Because of the competing goals, the guiding norms for an ethical land use law system
should touch upon the modes of allocation and the potential goods for allocation. Accordingly, a
city must conduct an ongoing process of public consultation about the future of its development.
This process should not be limited to a case-by-case hearing on specific developments.84 It
79
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should be future-looking. It requires, at the local level, an interdisciplinary think tank, which
could include urban planners, sociologists, economists, community workers, philosophers, and
others, as consultants, which would work with local people as representatives of different types
of groups— residents, developers, young people, families, etc.—who would suggest the local
policy. Cities are not identical, neither in their current status nor in their visions about the future,
which may well change over time. A local statement must be prepared, and updated from time to
time. This statement need describe the current situation—to what extent is it just? How diverse is
the city? What about density? Are there any specific areas which are denser than others? And
what about accessibility—is it granted to all? Answering these questions (for example) need rely
on a report about the city and its users, in a format that includes reference to the economic,
cultural, and societal viewpoints. On this basis, the statement should address the way it views the
future (5-10 years), and should be translated into complementary statutory land-use documents.85

B. DENSITY
The most important characteristic of urban areas is their density (number of people or dwelling
units per unit area) and thus their ability to accumulate clusters of activities.86 It has been argued
that the future of the city depends on the demand for density.87 This attribute is intimately
connected to advancing the economic viability, social homogeneity, and cultural development of
the world as a whole. Economists define cities as the spatial concentration of economic actors.88
Proximity to a concentrated labour market is economically valuable to producers and contributes
to the value of properties.89 The implication of this is that “the demand for cities must come
ultimately from the desire to reduce transport costs for goods, people and ideas.” 90 Richard
Schragger notes that, “clustering of people and firms is the chief characteristic of city space and
the central economic benefit for which some firms and residents are willing to pay higher
rents.”91 People and firms are more productive in cities because their agglomeration contributes
to the development of ideas and technology.92 The exchange of ideas in the urban environment
is, as Jane Jacobs maintained, one of the greatest advantages.93 With regard to the societalpsychological aspect, one of the main advantages of dense urban areas is that they facilitate
social interactions. Density is thus correlated with consumer amenities.94 Population density also
has a strong positive relationship with local innovation. People tend to be more inventive when
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they are around other inventive people.95 Several reasons have been offered for this
phenomenon: not only economies of scale and the availability of human capital, but also the
ability to be selective in identifying team members, which leads to more-productive work
environments.96

C. DIVERSITY
Population density must be accompanied by diversity. For density to play its part, it requires a
mixture of people from different backgrounds, who work in different occupations and hold
different beliefs, as well as a mixture of industries, services, facilities, and the like. Put
differently, if all people in the city were the same, they could not make a contribution to
inventiveness or productivity. To produce people who are more tolerant, cities must be
heterogeneous. Moreover, people are attracted to those cities which feature combinations of
niche sectors. A study of the occupational structure of fifty large American metropolitan areas
found that niches in exporting sectors and the related occupational mix were a key to urban
resurgence.97 Cities on the tourism map offer a variety of high-quality activities.98 Diversity is
perceived as an urban amenity, since urban consumers are attracted to ethnic restaurants,
international cultural offerings, and a lively street scene.99
A few years ago Robert Putnam, in a provocative paper, argued that residential racial
diversity has a price: it causes a decline in social capital.100 The derivative conclusion regarding
the reduced value of racial diversity was warmly adopted by some, while driving others to reexamine Putnam’s findings.101 Among the latter, Stephanie Stern recently suggested a reverse
explanation of the relationship between diversity and social capital, according to which it is
actually the case that where high levels of social capital are found, resistance to diversity will be
found. Supporting the existence and creation of diverse environments has moral value, with or
without this explanation. It puts people of heterogeneous backgrounds together, enabling them to
meet and interact; and it is a practice that facilitates possibilities of demarcating the
discriminating effects of social, racial, economic, and other natural or adopted categorizations.

D. ACCESSIBILITY
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Accessibility has two relevant meanings: (1) connectivity, i.e., the ability to physically arrive at a
place, using a means of transportation which does not cost too much or take too much time; and
(2) equal, free access to services, places, and opportunities.
It is commonly argued that accessibility qua connectivity is a fundamental concept in
theories of metropolitan spatial structure. The standard urban model explains urban structure as a
function of the trade-offs between access to jobs and housing costs; newer research focuses on
the trade-offs between access to jobs or other given activity and housing values. 102 Areas with
good access to public amenities not only gain better land value,103 but also attract a larger portion
of new development.104 Others have established that high environmental standards and good
access to facilities and services have a direct, positive impact on quality of life.105
Accessibility is also about non-excludability. Urban environments promise the
accessibility of services and public places and the opportunity to participate in political and
social life. This concept of accessibility and the importance accessibility should carry was
influenced heavily by the writings of Henri Lefbvre, though others, such as Iris Marion Young,
have also made clear the significance of “open and undecidable” borders to city life.106

E. BURDEN-BENEFIT RATIO PRINCIPLE107
The most important thing, and the trickiest one, is to identify how to fairly correlate between
burdens and benefits.108 A planning practice may be considered as creating inequality, or unfair
treatment, if those targeted by harmful regulation, such as eminent domain or the location of
unattractive uses, “are systematically different from those benefiting from public use projects
and the benefits of public projects do not sufficiently compensate.” 109 The future of land use law
is in identifying new regulatory models that mitigate these concerns. This should rely on
empirical, methodological, and theoretical work that would uncover the patterns of inequalities,
and support innovative ways to overcome them. Recent empirical works on the distribution of
burdens and benefits in the context of expropriations are a first step in this direction.110
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III. CONCLUSION
At the start of this paper, I promised only preliminary thoughts as to the contents and contours of
a vision for an ethical commitment in land use planning. I centred this article on the problem
with zoning and land use law, and particularly with the judicial review in this field, as the lack of
any substantial ethical commitment in the judicial review of land use decisions. Instead, the
planning decision-making process has led the judiciary, as well as many scholars, to focus on the
mere process of making planning decisions, rather than on the substantive content of planning.111
In my response to this theoretical quagmire, I propose that an ethical framework premised on
fairness and sustainability, wherein sustainability stands for fairness between present and future,
and between mankind and the environment. In the context of urban planning, fairness would be
guided by principles of democracy and transparency, by norms of accessibility, diversity, and
density, and by a requirement to preserve a fair ratio between the distribution of burdens and the
allocation of benefits. These principles, I argue, articulate an ethical commitment that should
guide the next 100 years (or so) of North American land use planning.
While I did not offer here how to advance this ethical commitment in practical or
empirical terms, nor did I offer how to design a more ethically grounded system, such work is
desperately needed. Indeed, there is a great room for local, community-based advances to be
made in this regard. Future work, in academia and in practice, should further think about, and
experiment with, how to bring together a working framework that is ethically committed and
could be scrutinized by the courts. So much is at stake here.
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